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A Strategy for the Twenty-First Century?
Christopher J. McMahon
The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the 
U-Boat peril.
WINSTON CHURCHILL
MARITIME TRADE WARFARE
 Maritime trade warfare, also called commerce warfare, is a naval/military strategy that has been followed since ancient times�1 The idea of maritime 
trade warfare is to attack or neutralize the commercial shipping of one’s enemy 
in an effort to disrupt the enemy’s economy, make it more difficult for the enemy 
to continue waging war by disrupting the enemy’s military supply chain that uses 
the sea, or both�
Maritime trade warfare can take different forms� Until the twentieth century, 
close blockades of an enemy’s ports were most common, conducted to prevent 
the movement of an enemy’s commercial shipping� In the twentieth century, 
with the introduction of new technologies such as the torpedo, submarine, and 
airplane, distant blockades (farther from the enemy coast) became standard prac-
tice� Mining of ports also was practiced�2 In addition, maritime exclusion zones 
(MEZs) sometimes were established to prevent shipping from entering a desig-
nated area� Maritime trade warfare also has included attacking or seizing enemy 
shipping in general, or outright destroying an enemy’s commercial shipping in 
particular� In the twentieth century, destruction of an enemy’s port infrastructure 
to prevent the loading or off-loading of commercial vessels also became a type of 
maritime trade warfare�3
The use of maritime trade warfare in World War II and, to some extent, World 
War I is commonly understood� In the latter part of World War I, for example, the 
Germans’ indiscriminate sinking of neutral vessels incensed the United States, 
eventually driving the country into the war on the side of the Allies�4 German 
employment of submarines (U-boats), particularly in World War II, played a 
large role in disrupting the flow of supplies from North America and the British 
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Empire that was supporting the Allied war effort�5 Similarly, the United States 
waged a very successful campaign of maritime trade warfare against the Empire 
of Japan in World War II�6
The present question is: Is maritime trade warfare still a viable strategy and 
tactic to be employed by warring powers today, or is it an anachronistic practice 
that has no place in twenty-first-century maritime conflicts? There seem to be 
two very different views on this question� On the one hand, there are military 
scholars and experts who not only promote the use of maritime trade warfare 
but also emphasize that modern navies should plan and exercise for it, from 
both offensive and defensive perspectives� On the other hand, there are military 
scholars and experts who argue that commerce warfare is a tactic of the past that 
is no longer viable, with no valid bearing on today’s world� Reasons for the latter 
viewpoint, among others that will be discussed below, include the interconnec-
tedness of the global economy and the nature of modern commercial shipping�
The purpose of this article is to consider both viewpoints and analyze their 
theories and supporting arguments� In the final analysis, the answer to the ques-
tion whether maritime trade warfare belongs in the twenty-first century is com-
plex� There are many obstacles to employing maritime trade warfare in a manner 
that would strangle an enemy’s economy effectively or prevent the movement of 
military supplies� However, history shows that, given just the right circumstances 
and time, maritime trade warfare can work� In any case, it is in the interest of 
military strategists and planners to plan for and exercise offensive and defensive 
maritime trade warfare in many potential conflict scenarios�
HISTORY OF MARITIME TRADE WARFARE
Maritime trade warfare is certainly not a new military strategy� It has been em-
ployed for thousands of years in various forms�
Early to Modern History
Maritime trade warfare was employed commonly throughout ancient Greek 
history� In his writings on the Greek Peloponnesian War, the ancient historian 
Thucydides (ca� 460 BCE–400 BCE) described nearly thirty years of war between 
Athens and Sparta� In these writings he referred to what was essentially maritime 
trade warfare�7
For much of history, commerce warfare largely was performed by privateers, 
who received letters of marque from their governments� This instrument pro-
vided state authorization for their actions in seizing enemy shipping� In truth, 
however, there was often a fine line between privateers and pirates, since they 
operated in very similar manners� In theory, a privateer acted at least partly in the 
interest of his nation, whereas a pirate acted solely in his own interest�8
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Essentially, privateers operating under letters of marque were nonmilitary 
persons given permission by their sovereigns or other governments to raid enemy 
shipping� This activity often was referred to as guerre de course� The intention was 
to enable a weaker naval power to attack a stronger power—and to seize booty in 
the process�9 Acting as privateers with a letter of marque, a captain and crew were 
protected from being brought up on charges of piracy if captured� When success-
ful in capturing an enemy merchant vessel, privateers turned over the vessel and 
cargo to the privateers’ government in exchange for prize money� Rewards for 
privateers often were substantial�10
From a government’s perspective, the major potential advantages of using 
privateers were the revenue generated and the damage inflicted on an enemy’s 
economy� And the efforts of privateers could be had with little or no cost to a 
belligerent’s treasury, because privateers often were completely self-funded� They 
might receive a small stipend from their host governments; Queen Elizabeth I of 
England, for example, partly funded the privateering efforts of Sir John Hawkins 
and Sir Francis Drake—Drake being, perhaps, the most successful privateer in 
history�11 Probably because of their low cost to governments combined with their 
successes, privateers continued to be used to wage warfare on enemy commerce 
until the dawn of the twentieth century�12
Through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, maritime trade warfare 
in Europe played a role in the almost continuous conflicts among the British, 
French, Spanish, Dutch, and others� In the second half of the seventeenth century, 
Louis XIV of France, “the Sun King” (1638–1715), engaged his country in three 
major wars: the Franco-Dutch War, the War of the League of Augsburg, and the 
War of the Spanish Succession� In all three wars, maritime trade warfare played 
an important role in damaging enemy economies and preventing the move-
ment of military supplies�13 Because France was primarily a continental power, it 
needed to fund and support large land forces� This left it with only a limited abil-
ity to build or sustain a substantial navy with which to attack enemy shipping or 
fleets directly (i�e�, guerre d’escadre, or war of fleets)� As an alternative, in the last 
decade of the seventeenth century the French began to practice guerre de course 
to contest their enemies’ complete command and control of the sea�14
The French enjoyed such great success with maritime trade warfare during 
this period that the noted late nineteenth-century naval theorist Rear Admiral 
Alfred Thayer Mahan, USN, suggested that “at no time has war against commerce 
been conducted on a larger scale and with greater results than during this period, 
� � � [which was] a large factor in bringing the sea nations to wish for peace�”15
Guerre de course or maritime trade warfare has been called a tactic of the 
weak because it often has been practiced by nations with weaker navies�16 The 
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American colonies employed commerce warfare from the late 1600s onward� For 
example, during times of conflict in the period 1739 to 1748, American colonial 
privateers sailed on some 466 privateering voyages and captured at least 829 for-
eign vessels�17 During the War of 1812, American privateers profited handsomely 
from attacks on British shipping�18
In the Mediterranean, commerce warfare—perhaps legitimately called piracy 
by some—occurred from Roman times into the nineteenth century� The Knights 
of Malta preyed on Ottoman shipping sailing between North African and Spanish 
ports� During the Crusades, Ottoman pirates profited frequently from attacks on 
European shipping� So too the famed “Barbary pirates” attacked ships from coun-
tries unwilling to pay a tribute to the local beys (rulers)� This included attacks 
in the late eighteenth century on merchant ships flagged by the new American 
republic, which prompted the U�S� Congress and president to establish a navy�19
Following the Crimean War in the mid-nineteenth century, the great powers 
of Europe negotiated the Declaration of Paris in 1856� Signing nations agreed to 
end guerre de course� The declaration pledged as follows: “Neutral goods, with 
the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under the enemy’s 
flag�”20 Not surprisingly, other countries did not sign the declaration� One such 
was the United States; because its Navy was small, guerre de course offered one of 
the few options by which it could attack a more-powerful naval power�21 Indeed, 
during the American Civil War, the Confederates employed guerre de course 
against Union merchant ships, albeit with only a modest degree of success�22
The twentieth century brought an entirely new approach to maritime trade 
warfare with the introduction of several new maritime and naval technologies� 
At first, in the very early part of the twentieth century, it appeared to some that 
maritime trade warfare actually might cease to be a tactic because of these tech-
nological advances and treaties such as the Declaration of Paris�
In fact, in 1911 the noted British naval theorist Sir Julian Corbett declared, 
“Modern developments and changes in shipping and naval material have indeed 
so profoundly modified the whole conditions of commerce protection, that there 
is no part of the strategy where historical deduction is more difficult or more 
liable to error�”23 Corbett believed it would be difficult to provide sufficient coal-
ing stations for modern steam-powered warships to cruise extensively to attack 
enemy shipping� He also believed (as though it were a requirement) that it would 
be difficult, if not impossible, to embark a prize crew on a captured vessel� As to 
merely sinking enemy vessels, Corbett famously stated, “No Power will incur the 
odium of sinking a prize with all hands, and their removal to the captor’s ship 
takes time�”24 He also theorized that since commercial steam vessels had great 
maneuverability, they could avoid potentially dangerous routes on which enemy 
warships might be lying in wait�25
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Needless to say, World Wars I and II clearly demonstrated the potential and 
effects of maritime trade warfare� At the beginning of World War I, German 
reliance on maritime trade for both imports and exports was substantial, and 
the British navy believed it had the potential to destroy the German economy 
through blockade�26 Ultimately, with the largest and most powerful navy in the 
world, Great Britain successfully blockaded Germany and prevented merchant 
vessels, German or otherwise, from trading at German ports�
According to Naval War 
College professor and naval 
theorist Dr� Milan Vego, “a 
blockaded countr y of ten 
resorts to commercial coun-
terblockade�”27 As an imperial 
power with the most far-flung 
empire in history, Britain was 
dependent on the sea for trade 
with its colonies and with nations providing matériel for the war effort� Not 
surprisingly, as the war progressed Germany increasingly countered the British 
blockade with commerce warfare, using the submarine�28
By the end of World War I, the Germans had managed to sink 11,153,000 tons 
of Allied merchant shipping, comprising 2,990 commercial ships and 578 fishing 
vessels� To accomplish this, the Germans used some 390 submarines, of which 
Allied forces sank 178�29
Although Germany was not as dependent on seaborne commerce at the 
beginning of World War II as it had been in 1914, its maritime trade was still 
important� As in World War I, the British early in World War II established a 
blockade of German ports� The Germans responded with commerce warfare in 
the form of air and submarine attacks on British, and later Allied, maritime trade 
and on British port infrastructure� In total, during this war the Germans sank 
5,150 Allied merchant ships displacing 21�57 million tons�30 The German attacks 
on maritime trade not only destroyed ships; they greatly disrupted the entire 
military supply chain by requiring the use of large, slow convoys and by causing 
substantial rerouting of ships, which increased voyage times� They also caused 
negative second-order effects by slowing the production of military equipment 
and supplies�31
The cost to the Germans of their submarine warfare campaign was the loss of 
785 submarines and their crews�32 However, looking at the big picture, the Allied 
cost in dollars and additional resources for protecting vessels with convoys and 
other measures and for merchant vessels lost nonetheless was substantially higher 
than the cost to the Germans of building and operating their submarine fleet�33 In 
Whether today’s Navy leadership believes 
that protecting shipping in a maritime trade 
warfare situation is a Navy mission is a moot 
point. . . . [T]he U.S. Navy has no doctrine 
and no current practices regarding protecting 
maritime commerce from attack, and precious 
few resources with which to do so in any case.
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other words, although the Germans were not ultimately successful in curtailing 
Allied maritime trade, they might have been if circumstances had been somewhat 
different� In any case, the U-boats greatly disrupted the entire Allied war effort 
and caused the Allies to expend substantial resources to protect their sea-lanes�34 
German maritime trade warfare was at least partly successful�
In World War II, the United States prosecuted a very successful maritime 
trade warfare campaign against Japan, destroying 8�1 million tons of merchant 
shipping� The United States employed 288 submarines in the Pacific, which were 
responsible for sinking about 4�9 million tons of that total; aircraft, surface ships, 
and mines accomplished the remainder� This crippled the Japanese merchant ma-
rine, which prevented the importation of critical supplies, starving the Japanese 
military, economy, and people�35 The Japanese did not employ any significant 
maritime trade warfare against the United States during World War II, because it 
simply was not a part of Japanese naval doctrine, nor did it seem to conform to 
the Japanese Bushido (warrior) code� Further, the Japanese offered no effective 
defenses against the U�S� maritime trade warfare campaign�36
Maritime Trade Warfare in the Latter Half of the Twentieth Century
As noted earlier, the 1856 Declaration of Paris banned attacks on commercial 
shipping by privateers—at least, those of the European nations that signed the 
treaty� This was followed by significant maritime technological advances in the 
construction of naval vessels, including submarines, and the torpedo, which 
caused at least some naval theorists—such as the respected Sir Julian Corbett 
quoted earlier—to believe that commerce warfare in the modern age was far-
fetched and very unlikely� Obviously, the events of World Wars I and II proved 
otherwise�37
In the dozens of conflicts that have broken out around the globe since World 
War II, maritime trade warfare has been relatively rare� During the U�S� interven-
tions in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, it was and has been limited or 
nonexistent� As a result of the lack of maritime trade warfare in recent times, and 
in a manner similar to the propositions of naval theorists a century ago, there 
are those who believe that commerce warfare has been relegated to the history 
books� As Professor Douglas Peifer of the University of North Carolina notes in 
an article, “‘Maritime commerce warfare’ has a distinctly dated whiff�”38 Still, as in 
the days of Corbett, this contention can be called into question�
Indeed, maritime trade warfare did occur in the second half of the twentieth 
century, albeit infrequently� During the period of the Yom Kippur or Ramadan 
War of 1973, for example, the Egyptians attempted to blockade commercial ship-
ping traffic to prevent oil tankers from reaching Israel from Iran� To accomplish 
this, the Egyptians mined Israeli ports and declared a naval blockade in the Red 
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Sea� Had the war lasted longer, the Egyptians’ maritime trade warfare might have 
been successful, because Israel had no other method of obtaining the necessary 
oil supplies�39
The Iran-Iraq War (1980–88) provides another very clear example of maritime 
trade warfare in relatively recent times� The so-called tanker war began in early 
1981, when the Iraqis announced that all shipping headed to and from Iran was 
subject to attack� In 1982, Iraq attacked the Iranian oil terminal and commercial 
shipping at Khārk (Kharg) Island�40 In every respect, this was maritime trade 
warfare�
Initially, Iran had little ability to attack commercial shipping bound for Iraq, 
but this eventually changed; by 1987, Iran was targeting tankers bound for Iraq 
effectively� In 1986, to protect its shipping interests, Kuwait requested assistance 
from the international community, including the United States� In 1987, several 
Kuwaiti tankers were reflagged to the United States, in theory protecting them 
from Iraqi or Iranian attack, since the United States was a neutral nation�41 In any 
case, it was conjectured that the U�S� Navy would protect these ships through a 
convoy system, which is what eventually occurred�
In total, the marine insurance company Lloyd’s of London reported that 546 
commercial ships were damaged during the Iran-Iraq War, killing 430 merchant 
mariners�42 Of the ships attacked, very few actually were sunk� Sixty-one percent 
of the vessels attacked (239 ships) were tankers� Fifty-five of these tankers were 
declared “constructive total losses�” Thirty-nine percent of the bulk carriers at-
tacked and 32 percent of the freighters attacked also were declared constructive 
total losses�43
The Use of Mines in Maritime Trade Warfare
Although the American David Bushnell is credited with developing the first na-
val mine in 1776 and mines were used to a limited extent in nineteenth-century 
wars, it was during World War I that the mine became a major weapon against 
navies and merchant ships�44 Mines historically have been used to restrict access 
to a sea area and to blockade commercial vessels from port areas—a form of 
maritime trade warfare� Certainly World Wars I and II offer many examples of 
this type of warfare� In World War II alone some seven hundred thousand mines 
were sown� These accounted for the loss of 650 Allied ships and 1,100 Axis ships, 
with another eight hundred damaged between them� In fact, mines damaged or 
sank more vessels than any other weapon�45 Perhaps the best example of the use 
of mines in maritime trade warfare was Operation STARVATION in the summer 
of 1945, for which the U�S� Navy and Army Air Corps sowed eleven thousand 
mines off the coasts and ports of Japan, sinking 605 Japanese merchant ships and 
sixty-five warships�46
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From May 1972 through January 1973, the United States mined Haiphong 
Harbor in North Vietnam and two other, smaller North Vietnamese ports� This 
effectively closed these ports to commercial shipping, forcing North Vietnam 
to use inland roads and railroads from Chinese ports for imports and exports�47
During the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, Iran made extensive use of mines in an 
effort to blockade Kuwaiti ports� The mines damaged numerous merchant ships 
from many countries, although these efforts did not curtail merchant shipping 
in the Persian Gulf�48
ARGUMENTS FOR THE USE OF MARITIME TRADE WARFARE IN 
THE FUTURE
Some theorists believe that maritime trade warfare will continue to be used in any 
lengthy war conducted at least partly at sea�49 Supporters of maritime trade war-
fare acknowledge that, for it to be an effective instrument for crippling an enemy’s 
economy in general and preventing military supplies in particular from getting 
through, the time factor is essential� In other words, it takes time for maritime 
trade warfare to have the desired economic and military effects�
Geography also plays an important role in maritime trade warfare� An island 
nation, a coastal nation isolated by geographical features that are a barrier to 
land trade, or a nation with hostile neighbors is more vulnerable to maritime 
trade warfare�50 Regarding the notion that because of the integration of the global 
economy commerce warfare is unlikely in future conflicts, proponents note that 
before 1914 many Europeans believed that a large-scale European war never 
would happen because it would lead to a European economic collapse that would 
harm all participating nations� Proponents argue that in many ways the global 
economy was intertwined prior to World War I in ways similar to today, yet both 
sides used maritime trade warfare as a tactic during the war�51
Prospects for Blockading
Given the past successes of maritime trade warfare, some experts contend that 
commerce warfare not only is likely to be practiced but should be incorpo-
rated into many conflict scenarios as an essential component of military strategy 
and tactics� In a Yale Law Journal article written in the 1990s, author Michael 
Fraunces notes:
In the future, blockade may become even more important as the need of a blockad-
ing state to stop every merchant ship grows vital� The recent willingness of ostensibly 
neutral states to supply not simply technical know-how and materials for weapons of 
mass destruction, but also ready-for-use missiles and other decisive weapons, to the 
highest bidder portends such a future� As the negative consequences of allowing even 
one ship to pass uninspected grow more severe, blockading states will become more 
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willing to use the new blockade forms (long-range blockade and blockade zones) at 
the expense of neutral interests�52
To be sure, discussion in military circles today regarding maritime trade war-
fare is very limited, if it occurs at all� There currently is no U�S� military doctrine 
that even raises the issues of offensive or defensive maritime trade warfare� This 
situation is reminiscent of the interwar years: despite the extensive use of mari-
time trade warfare during World War I, requiring the United States to protect its 
convoys, during the 1920s and ’30s the Navy essentially forgot the lessons it had 
learned� When the United States entered World War II, German submarines had 
a field day sinking American shipping, often in plain sight of the American main-
land, because merchant shipping was given no protection at all�53 The then Com-
mander in Chief, United States Fleet, Admiral Ernest J� King, believed the Navy 
had no obligation to protect 
commercial shipping, in light 
of the many other demands 
the service faced at the time�54 
Whether today’s Navy leader-
ship believes that protecting 
shipping in a maritime trade 
warfare situation is a Navy mission is a moot point� Aside from fighting piracy in 
East Africa, which could be regarded as protecting shipping, the U�S� Navy has no 
doctrine and no current practices regarding protecting maritime commerce from 
attack, and precious few resources with which to do so in any case�
Some military experts contend that maritime trade warfare not only is likely in 
future conflicts, but that it can and should be a strategy the United States directs 
its military to employ� The services therefore should plan for and practice this 
employment, in the form of military exercises conducted from both offensive 
and defensive perspectives� Given the growing power, including naval power, 
of several nations around the world, some military experts have weighed the 
potential for maritime trade warfare being employed in a conflict and believe it 
is a worthy strategy�
The possibility of conducting maritime trade warfare against China is one ex-
ample� In a paper entitled “Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely 
Conflict,” retired U�S� Marine Corps colonel T� X� Hammes contends that in a 
protracted conflict with China the United States could employ a strategy of “off-
shore control” to interdict China’s energy, raw material, and industrial imports 
and exports to strangle the country’s economy� According to Hammes, this could 
be achieved through the use of Navy ships, Army and Navy boarding teams, and 
contracted shipping and helicopters�55
[O]pponents of modern commerce warfare 
contend that it simply is not possible to isolate 
a powerful nation through maritime trade 
warfare without devastating the entire global 
economy.
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Essentially, Colonel Hammes believes that blockading shipments to China 
through the Straits of Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda and controlling the north–
south routes to and from Australia could block 80 percent of China’s oil imports� 
Further, blockading exports from China would rob China of its source of eco-
nomic power� This would force the Chinese to the bargaining table, which very 
likely would end the conflict�56
Colonel Hammes states:
Clearly the U�S� Navy has insufficient ships to control the almost 1,500 very large 
commercial ships projected to be in use by 2015� However, these numbers can be 
controlled by U�S� amphibious shipping projecting Army and Marine boarding par-
ties that will travel with the ships to ensure they do not enter the maritime exclu-
sion zone� Commercial shipping and helicopters could be contracted to support the 
distant efforts, thus reducing the stress on the amphibious fleet�57
In their article “No Oil for the Lamps of China,” authors Gabriel Collins and 
William Murray further explain how the U�S� Navy could block the key straits on 
Chinese trade routes effectively:
It appears then that at least ten surface warships and two replenishment vessels would 
be required to establish an effective and protected distant blockade at the Straits of 
Malacca� This number would increase proportionally if the Lombok Strait, Sunda 
Strait, and the route around Australia also had to be patrolled� The authors estimate 
that three surface warships and accompanying replenishment vessels per additional 
strait would be necessary to provide reasonable assurance that all passing tankers 
could be boarded, inspected, and if necessary escorted to a quarantine anchorage� 
This gives a minimum total of sixteen surface warships and four replenishment  
vessels�58 
In a well-researched article in the Journal of Strategic Studies, author Sean 
Mirski argues as follows: “A blockade strategy [against China] is viable, but it 
would be limited to a narrow context: the United States would have to be en-
gaged in a protracted conflict over vital interests, and it would need the support 
of key regional powers� The United States would also need to implement a mix 
between a close and distant blockade in order to avoid imperiling the conflict’s 
strategic context� If enacted, a blockade could exact a ruinous cost on the Chinese 
economy and state�”59 Mirski comments that the existing literature on commerce 
warfare is “remarkably sparse, circumscribed, and inconclusive,” in large part be-
cause commercial links between China and the United States are so intertwined 
that maritime trade warfare is considered unlikely because it would be too mutu-
ally destructive�60
Yet Naval War College professor Dr� Milan Vego believes that maritime trade 
warfare remains a possibility in the future� He notes that another large-scale 
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global war may never occur; however, history suggests that the improbable often 
becomes reality� He uses World War I as an example; as noted earlier, theorists in 
the early twentieth century did not believe a large European war would occur—
yet it did� Similarly, some naval theorists in the early part of the twentieth century 
suggested that the days of commerce warfare were over—yet in both world wars, 
maritime trade warfare was definitely a reality�61 Accordingly, Vego believes that 
in a large, long-term conflict, maritime trade warfare is probable� He also believes 
that attacks on maritime trade might take the form of attacks on infrastructure 
and ports and, perhaps, some forms of cyber warfare, but that “attacks on ships 
at sea and in port would also be essential�”62
Prospects for Use of Mines
Historically, mines have been used effectively to blockade merchant shipping 
from entering a belligerent’s ports� In numerous conflicts, mines have proved 
themselves to be quite deadly� It is noteworthy that since World War II, fourteen 
USN ships have been sunk or damaged by mines, compared with only two that 
have been damaged by missile or air attack�63 Mines are relatively inexpensive, 
and nations throughout the world keep tens of thousands in their inventories�64
Available current literature on the use of mines to blockade as a form of com-
merce warfare is quite sparse� However, given the low cost and deadly effective-
ness of mines in past conflicts, it seems reasonable to some experts that mines 
could play an important role in modern maritime trade warfare by effectively 
blockading the ports and harbors of an enemy�
ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE LIKELIHOOD OF MARITIME TRADE 
WARFARE IN THE FUTURE
While acknowledging the historical successes of maritime trade warfare, there 
are those who contend that this type of warfare is essentially a strategy and tactic 
of the past� Numerous factors support this position�
The Nature of the Global Economy
In a manner similar to the arguments offered prior to World War I, the integrated 
nature of the global economy today and the difficulty of interdicting maritime 
commerce often are cited as reasons there will be no maritime trade warfare in 
the future� In 1897, Germany’s Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz—given the 
situation at the time—projected as follows: “Commerce raiding and transatlantic 
war against England is so hopeless, because of the shortage of bases on our side 
and the superfluity on England’s side, that we must ignore this type of war against 
England in our plans for the constitution of our fleet�”65 Obviously, Admiral 
Tirpitz’s prediction of how developments would unfold was significantly off the 
mark�
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Regarding the integrated global economy of today, opponents of modern com-
merce warfare contend that it simply is not possible to isolate a powerful nation 
through maritime trade warfare without devastating the entire global economy� 
Yes, the global economy was integrated to some extent prior to World War I, but 
not to the degree and scope that it is today� The technological developments in 
communications and transportation and more-positive international govern-
ment policy environments established around the world in the last half-century 
have expanded trade greatly in both size and scope�66 At the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, global trade was estimated to be U�S�$1�5 billion; by 1850 
this had risen to $4 billion; and by 1900 to $24 billion�67 In 2014, global trade was 
reported to be $18�5 trillion�68 Worldwide, in manufacturing exports alone there 
was a 3,500 percent increase just from 1950 to 1998�69
World Wars I and II devastated the global economy� The reasoning follows 
that, with the economic destruction they inflicted so obvious, and with the global 
economy even more integrated today than it was prior to those wars, another 
conflict involving maritime trade warfare is as unthinkable as it is unlikely�
The Nature of Global Merchant Shipping
The complexity of the global commercial maritime business also is put forward 
as a reason maritime trade warfare is unlikely in the future� Until the late 1940s, 
commercial ships typically were financed, owned, built, and crewed in the flag 
state of their registry� This changed dramatically in the decades after World War 
II, with the proliferation of “flag-of-convenience registries�”70 Today, more than 
half the world’s merchant ships are registered in flag-of-convenience countries�71 
In many cases, the actual ownership of a vessel is difficult to ascertain�
Complicating this is the very nature of modern commercial shipping� Owner-
ship of bulk cargoes such as oil, grain, and iron ore, as well as the destinations of 
those cargoes, can change, sometimes repeatedly, as cargoes are sold and resold 
throughout the course of a voyage� With general cargo and container vessels, 
ownership and cargo destinations also can be complex� A single ship can contain 
multiple cargoes—sometimes thousands—destined for dozens of countries, often 
located far beyond the port of discharge�72 The basic problem is that boarding, 
search, and seizure of vessels and cargoes on the high seas is complicated because 
it can be difficult to identify the ownership of a ship and cargo and because a ves-
sel’s cargoes often are destined for many countries� When a nation seizes or sinks 
a vessel apparently bound for a belligerent nation, its cargo, or at least a portion 
thereof, may be the property of a neutral nation, or even an ally�
Another factor of the modern global merchant marine is simply its size� 
In 1939, prior to World War II, the combined size of the entire global mer-
chant marine was about fifty-seven million deadweight tons�73 This included 
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approximately twelve thousand vessels in deep-sea trade� Today, the size of the 
global merchant marine is about 1�75 billion deadweight tons, with about ninety 
thousand commercial vessels�74 In other words, there are tens of thousands more 
vessels in the world today than in the decades prior to World War II, and they are 
larger as well� At the same time, the number of naval vessels available in the larger 
navies of the world today—those warships capable of conducting maritime trade 
warfare or interdiction in any form—is very small�
These factors clearly indicate that conducting maritime trade warfare effec-
tively would be exceedingly difficult in most scenarios today� Identifying vessels 
and cargoes belonging to a belligerent is much more complex today than it was in 
those historical situations in which maritime trade warfare proved a productive 
strategy and tactic� In any case, the number of naval vessels or auxiliaries needed 
to implement successfully an effective maritime trade warfare campaign would 
be very substantial—far more, in most scenarios, than the number of vessels 
needed during World War II� Compounding this is the fact that even the large 
navies of the world today are much smaller than in the era of the world wars�
Use of Alternative Intermodal Transportation
There are other reasons to argue that maritime trade warfare in the twenty-first 
century would require massive resources yet would be ineffective� As maritime 
transportation technologies have made great strides with the development of 
containerization and container shipping, so too have land port infrastructure 
and intermodal transportation� The majority of the world is linked as never be-
fore, not just by ports but by highly efficient ports, ports that are linked to vast 
networks of roads, railroads, and airports� This means that, in many cases, trade 
by sea can be bypassed by using other modes of transportation� Doing so might 
raise transportation costs significantly, but it nonetheless could render maritime 
trade warfare ineffective�
It must be noted, for example, that even during World War II German mari-
time trade warfare in the Atlantic was not effective in blocking the majority of 
economic and military supplies from reaching the Soviet Union from North 
America� In fact, of the supplies sent that reached the Soviet Union, 23 percent 
did so through Iran and another 46 percent reached Pacific coast ports of the So-
viet Union—passing near Japan, which had a nonaggression pact with the Soviet 
Union until 1945� Today, in an era of much more sophisticated railroad, pipeline, 
and aviation intermodal links, maritime trade warfare alone, in many cases, 
would not isolate a country—particularly one with friendly or neutral countries 
on its borders� In a conflict with China, for example, it would be highly unlikely 
that land intermodal shipments of oil and other cargoes to and from one or more 
of China’s many neighbors could be blocked�75
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In November 2014, for example, China initiated a new train service from 
China west to Spain, a route covering a distance of some 6,200 miles and requir-
ing approximately twenty-one days’ travel�76 In January 2017, the first freight 
train from China arrived in London after a 7,500-mile journey, having reached 
its destination in eighteen days—half the time required for a sea voyage�77 In ad-
dition, China has the ability to link to Russia’s Trans-Siberian Railway and other 
rail lines across Asia� Further, according to Global Risk Insights, during the past 
few years Russia and China have forged new energy deals that will open energy 
pipeline links from Russia to China�78 The Chinese also are funding both rail 
and pipeline links from China to Myanmar ports so as to bypass the Straits of 
Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda�79
In other words, although the Chinese do rely on ocean transportation for the 
majority of their energy, raw materials, and exports, they have several neighbors 
and connections to numerous intermodal links to the Middle East and Europe 
that could ease their dependence on marine transportation during a military 
conflict� Most coastal nations, especially large nations, have the same ability�
Use of Reserves and Rationing
For any military conflict or other national emergency in which vital imports 
such as energy supplies are required, many nations around the world have plans 
and infrastructure in place to conduct rationing� In addition, many countries, 
including the United States, have established substantial petroleum reserves, 
which would provide energy supplies for an extended period during a national 
emergency�80
If targeted states brought in resources via intermodal links other than the sea, 
then rationed them carefully, the results desired from maritime trade warfare 
might be minimal�
The Naval Resources Question
The question of the naval resources needed to conduct maritime trade warfare in 
the form of imposing an effective blockade is a very significant one� With regard 
to a country such as China—or any other country in East Asia, for that matter—
the supporters of maritime trade warfare cited in this article focus on blockades 
of the Straits of Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda as the method for restricting en-
ergy supply lines or otherwise curtailing economic activity, particularly exports� 
These studies indicate that a relatively small number of naval ships could block-
ade the Straits of Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda successfully, effectively isolating 
the energy and economic supply lines to and from China�81
However, the imposition of a blockade in these straits would be illegal under 
international law, as represented by the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea� The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations notes:
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 Belligerent forces transiting through international straits overlapped by neutral 
waters must proceed without delay, must refrain from the threat or use of force 
against the neutral nation, and must otherwise refrain from acts of hostility and other 
activities not incident to their transit� � � � Belligerent forces may not use neutral straits 
as a place of sanctuary or as a base of operations and belligerent warships may not 
exercise the belligerent right of visit and search in those waters�82
It could, perhaps, be argued that blockading naval vessels could operate in 
waters sufficiently far away from international straits to remain compliant with 
international law� However, this would increase significantly the number of naval 
resources required to implement an effective blockade� In any case, 2014 data 
indicate that in that year alone there were some 79,000 transits through the Strait 
of Malacca� These involved 25,071 containerships and 4,993 very large crude oil 
carriers (VLCCs), in addition to tens of thousands of smaller cargo vessels and 
tankers� This translates to about 217 ships a day passing through the Strait of 
Malacca�83 Adding the vessels transiting the Sunda and Lombok Straits would in-
crease significantly the daily and annual ship-transit totals� Simply put, the naval 
resources needed to effect a legal blockade in areas near these straits—to board, 
search, and inspect vessels and to provide escorts to quarantine anchorages for 
suspect vessels—would be far more significant than is accounted for in any of the 
sources cited in this article�
It further complicates this problem that there is a huge swath of the Pacific 
Ocean that could be used for alternative routes to China and the rest of East 
Asia—numerous Pacific Ocean trade routes to Asia are available that do not use 
any strait� True, this would add to shipping and other transportation costs, owing 
to the longer distances covered (west from the Panama Canal and northwest from 
Cape Horn), but nevertheless these routes could be used�
For a VLCC traveling from Saudi Arabian oil terminals to Shanghai, China, 
today, for example, the transportation cost of crude oil is thirteen to eighteen 
cents per gallon for a transit of about eighteen days�84 Crude oil transportation 
to China from Venezuela instead, via the Panama Canal in a tanker somewhat 
smaller than a VLCC, would require twenty-six days� VLCC oil transportation 
from Angola to China via Cape Horn would entail a voyage of about forty days�85
Clearly, the added distance in longer voyages would add to transportation 
costs—possibly doubling them, or more—but this hardly would impose an in-
surmountable expense if the Straits of Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda were being 
blockaded� The Suez Canal has been closed five times since its opening in 1869, 
including for the eight years between 1967 and 1975�86 Oil tankers and cargo ves-
sels transiting from the Middle East to Europe and the Americas were required 
to transit much longer distances around the Cape of Good Hope, and at greater 
expense to shippers, but this did not impose an overbearing economic hardship 
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on the countries of Europe or the Americas� Similarly, if the Straits of Malacca, 
Lombok, and Sunda were blockaded, using Pacific Ocean shipping routes to East 
Asia would create a hardship, but one that could be endured�
Any attempt to conduct maritime trade warfare (or interdiction) against all 
the Pacific Ocean route approaches to Asia and the approaches to the Straits of 
Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda would require a huge number of naval vessels, with 
all the complicated logistics and resupply associated therewith� Further, for every 
naval and resupply vessel used for maritime trade warfare and blockade, one 
fewer vessel would be available for other naval missions—missions that probably 
would be critically important in a time of military conflict�
The Targeting Problem
As noted earlier, there are some ninety thousand deep-sea commercial vessels 
in the world� This does not include hundreds of thousands of fishing vessels, 
coastwise vessels, and other special-purpose vessels� The waters in and around 
East Asia teem with traffic—thousands of vessels within a relatively small area� 
Identifying which vessels to board, search, and seize would be a daunting task 
that would get harder the closer one approached the Asian mainland or a choke 
point such as a strait�
It is true that commercial vessels now broadcast on an Automatic Identifica-
tion System (AIS) frequency, by which they identify themselves, but AIS can be 
switched off� During the recent piracy crisis off the coast of Somalia, for example, 
many vessels simply turned off their AIS to avoid identification� In a maritime 
trade warfare situation, many vessels, including neutral vessels, likely would not 
broadcast their AIS signals, further complicating identification efforts�87
The Complexity Involved in Sinking Vessels
Some supporters of maritime trade warfare suggest the establishment of a mari-
time exclusion zone, with any commercial vessel entering the MEZ subject to 
attack and sinking� The theory is that this would prevent merchant ships from 
entering the zone�
However, the collateral consequences of sinking a modern commercial ves-
sel would be huge� Sinking a vessel likely would result in the deaths of innocent 
merchant mariners, probably from a large number of nations, including friendly 
or neutral ones� Some might view this as a war crime�
In addition, the environmental impact of sinking a large ship, especially a pe-
troleum tanker, would be immense� Sinking a VLCC, which can carry more than 
165 million gallons of crude oil, would create an environmental disaster of epic 
proportions� The destruction of fishing grounds and the pollution of thousands 
of square miles of coastlines would be enormous�
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While the German and American navies had great success in sinking mer-
chant vessels during World War II, the problem today is much more complex� 
Simply put, merchant ships now are huge—much larger than those that sailed the 
seas during the twentieth-century world wars� It likely would take a significant 
amount of ordnance to sink a ship, or even to damage and disable it� Recall that 
very few of the 546 ships attacked during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s were 
declared constructive total losses, and almost none actually were sunk� No recent 
studies are available that analyze the methods and weapon capabilities needed to 
sink modern commercial vessels; the problem is likely much more complex than 
many realize�
Adding to this problem is the scarce inventory of available weapons and ord-
nance� Just as the number of naval vessels available for maritime trade warfare is 
extremely small, so too is the availability of ordnance needed to accomplish the 
task� While production of naval ships, weapons, and ordnance in theory could 
be ramped up, this would take a substantial amount of time� In fact, it would 
take much more time than was needed after America entered World War II in 
December of 1941� At that time shipbuilding and weapons-manufacturing com-
panies already had increased their production substantially over a span of years, 
yet it took years more for the United States to produce enough ships, weapons, 
and ordnance to protect against German maritime trade warfare effectively and 
to establish an offensive maritime trade warfare campaign against Japan�
Maritime Trade Warfare Does Not Curtail Shipping
Some believe that even the threat of maritime trade warfare would cause ship-
owners from nonbelligerent countries to keep their vessels out of hostile waters� 
In individual instances this might be true, but history shows that generally it is 
not so� During the age of sail, shipowners were quite willing to sail into harm’s 
way because profit motives outweighed concern for the safety of their vessels�
The world wars of the twentieth century also offer no exception� During the 
relatively recent tanker wars during the Iran-Iraq War, there was an initial 25 
percent decrease in shipping traffic, but this soon changed as profits for shipown-
ers soared� More ships became available to carry crude oil, despite the dangers 
involved� To cover the cost of higher marine insurance premiums, Iran reduced 
the price of its oil exports�88
The Question of Mines
Historically, mines have been used effectively in commerce warfare as a form 
of blockade to close the ports and harbors of a belligerent� Given the massive 
number of mines in the current inventories of some nations, it seems reason-
able that mines might be used with great effectiveness, and in some cases this is 
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probably true� For a relatively small island nation with a limited number of ports, 
an enemy with substantial mining capabilities probably could blockade its ports 
very effectively�
However, the scenarios under which this might occur are quite limited� With 
regard to large countries having multiple ports and effective militaries, the chal-
lenges to effective mining are many� In a country such as the United States or 
China, for example, it would be exceedingly difficult for an enemy’s submarines, 
other vessels, or aircraft to sow mines in ports, harbors, or approach channels� 
During the India-Pakistan War of 1971, for example, Pakistan attempted to sow 
mines in Indian waters with a submarine, but was unsuccessful owing to Indian 
navy intervention�89
A large country such as the 
United States, India, or China 
or an economic zone such 
as the European Union has 
dozens of ports� The resources 
needed to blockade all these 
ports effectively using mines 
would be quite substantial, 
and such efforts similarly 
would be vulnerable to intervention by local navies� Further, merchant ships 
blockaded from one port could shift to ports in neighboring countries and load 
and discharge their cargoes at intermodal facilities there, thereby limiting the 
mine blockade’s effectiveness� As noted previously, the United States did manage 
to close North Vietnamese ports with mines during the latter half of the Vietnam 
War; however, North Vietnam at the time had only one large port and two smaller 
ones, and no navy to challenge the U�S� Navy� Despite the resultant reduction in 
transportation capabilities, North Vietnam was able to divert shipping to Chinese 
ports and use road and rail into North Vietnam, although this was less efficient�
Finally, the mine ordnance necessary to effect a commercial blockade is sig-
nificant and grows substantially as the number of ports, harbors, channels, and 
coastal areas that require mining increases� And the United States, for example, 
has only a very small inventory of mines�
A review of the sources cited in this article reveals general agreement that deter-
mining the likelihood of maritime trade warfare being practiced in the future is 
a complex question� The proponents and opponents of maritime trade warfare 
agree that, to be effective, maritime trade warfare generally needs to be executed 
over a significant span of time� The American and German campaigns of World 
[I]f plans are not put in place and exercised to 
protect strategic sealift vessels, . . . protection 
of warships is really a moot point. Without 
a reliable and capable supply chain of com-
mercial and military logistics ships, warships 
cannot operate and fight far from American 
shores for any significant span of time.
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War II eventually had great effect, but required several years to reach that point� 
The Egyptian campaign against Israel in 1967 was not effective because of its 
short duration�
Proponents and opponents of maritime trade warfare also agree that any use 
of this strategy and tactic would have devastating impacts on today’s global econ-
omy� An unanswered question is whether maritime trade warfare really would 
bring a belligerent nation to the bargaining table, or simply escalate the conflict, 
which might spiral out of control� The answer seems to be that it would depend 
entirely on the situation; either result might occur� This certainly makes reliance 
on maritime trade warfare a dangerous business�
Another concern is that in regional or limited wars with powerful nations 
involved, commerce warfare is likely to create second-order effects that might 
draw other nations into the conflict� In the colonial-era Seven Years’ War, for 
example, British commerce raiding expanded beyond attacks on French vessels to 
include attacks on neutral Dutch vessels, which strained relations with a friendly 
country�90 In the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War, Russia, fearing consequences 
after numerous protests from the British and American governments, restricted 
its maritime trade warfare�91 In the early part of World War II, Hitler specifically 
forbade German submarines from attacking American vessels lest such attacks 
bring the United States into the war on Britain’s side�92 Would similar problems 
arise with modern use of maritime trade warfare? Would allied nations support 
maritime trade warfare, or would they attempt to circumvent blockades? Again, 
either outcome might occur�
Maritime trade warfare, however likely or unlikely it is to occur, could have 
vast global, regional, and national consequences� Therefore policy makers and 
military planners should consider the topic thoroughly from an offensive and—
equally important—a defensive standpoint� When the United States entered 
World War II, the Navy was ill prepared for German maritime trade warfare and 
largely remained so until 1943� The resulting commercial and military sealift 
shipping losses were enormous, and thousands of merchant mariners lost their 
lives�93 The United States today is equally unprepared to defend itself against 
maritime trade warfare or to protect American commerce and strategic sealift 
on the high seas�
To support its allies and national interests, the United States has taken on 
worldwide missions, and therefore has the most expeditionary military in the 
world� With the requirement to operate, in many cases, far forward from the 
continental United States, the armed forces rely heavily on ocean transportation 
for the majority of their lift capacity, in terms of tonnage� To support its world-
wide ocean-transportation needs, the U�S� military depends on internal sealift 
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capabilities through the Navy’s Military Sealift Command; for rapid deployment, 
on the Maritime Administration’s Ready Reserve Fleet of government-owned 
vessels; and for sustainment, on the U�S� Merchant Marine (commercial vessels)� 
This triad of fleets offers substantial sealift capacity�
However, the potential for losses in this maritime capability through the of-
fensive actions of enemy maritime trade warfare against the United States simply 
is not factored adequately into the nation’s policies or plans� During a July 2014 
congressional hearing on sealift force requirements, the deputy commander 
of U�S� Transportation Command was asked about the potential for attacks on 
strategic sealift vessels� In his response he admitted, “So in terms of protecting 
ships as they go across [the ocean], we � � � don’t have a lot of attrition built into 
our modeling� � � � [T]hat is not something that we really build in there�”94 In other 
words, although the United States currently has a substantial military sealift ca-
pability, the losses resulting from even moderately successful attacks on U�S�-flag 
shipping could have far-reaching consequences�
Further, the number of U�S�-flag merchant vessels engaged in international 
trade and available for strategic sealift is very small—seventy-eight—compared 
with the tens of thousands of merchant ships under other flags�95 Should losses 
occur in the U�S� Merchant Marine as a result of an enemy maritime warfare 
campaign, it is certainly questionable whether America could rely on foreign-flag 
commercial vessels for economic or military sealift�96 Yet this topic receives little 
attention�
Perhaps logically, USN planning efforts center on the protection of surface 
combatants, particularly aircraft carriers� However, if plans are not put in place 
and exercised to protect strategic sealift vessels, to include both government-
owned vessels and those of the U�S� Merchant Marine, protection of warships is 
really a moot point� Without a reliable and capable supply chain of commercial 
and military logistics ships, warships cannot operate and fight far from American 
shores for any significant span of time�
The conduct of maritime trade warfare in the twenty-first century represents 
a complex problem that in many conflict scenarios would not yield positive 
results� However, history is full of examples of maritime trade warfare proving 
an effective strategy against enemies—which sometimes was the United States� 
Likewise, history is full of examples of “experts” and political leaders insisting 
that maritime trade warfare would not work—only to be proved very wrong as 
new conflicts and scenarios presented themselves�
Accordingly, it seems quite appropriate in the twenty-first century that his-
torical lessons learned from maritime trade warfare campaigns of the past be 
studied carefully, and that political leaders and military planners consider, plan, 
and exercise scenarios involving maritime trade warfare from both offensive and 
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defensive perspectives� Doing anything less risks repeating some of the greatest 
mistakes of maritime history�
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